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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 12, 2008, Brian K. Bates, an Ohio citizen, was seriously injured in a
car accident due to the negligence of another driver.1 Because Bates was unable to
pay all of the $185,000 worth of his medical expenses, he relied upon Medicaid to
pay about $67,245.37 on his behalf.2 Following his accident, Bates filed a claim with
a value of over $500,000 against the negligent driver.3 The parties, however,
1

Encompass Indem. Co. v. Bates, No. 11AP-1010, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012).
2

Id.

3

Id. at *6.
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eventually agreed to settle Bates’ claim for $100,000—twenty percent of the claim’s
true value.4 After attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses were deducted from Bates’
settlement, only $62,000 remained, and from this remaining $62,000, Ohio’s
Medicaid agency, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS), then
sought reimbursement for the medical payments it made on Bates’ behalf.5
Pursuant to Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability statute, which requires ODJFS
to recover from a Medicaid recipient’s tort settlement with a liable third party the
lesser of all that it paid on the recipient’s behalf or fifty percent of the recipient’s
total settlement value,6 ODJFS claimed fifty percent7 ($31,000) of Bates’ remaining
$62,000 settlement.8 Bates, however, argued that pursuant to a recent Supreme Court
decision, Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn,9 ODJFS
should only have been entitled to recover twenty percent of his remaining settlement
($13,449.07)10 because he settled his claim for twenty percent of its true value.11
If Bates’ settlement was specifically allocated for medical expenses, his
argument would have been upheld under the Ahlborn ruling, leaving him with a
remaining settlement of $48,550.93.12 Because his settlement was not specifically
allocated for medical expenses, however, the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals
affirmed ODJFS’ recovery under the Ohio Medicaid reimbursement statute, leaving
Bates with a remaining settlement of only $31,000 from a claim worth over
$500,000.13 As Bates received a full $17,550.93 less than he would have if his
settlement was allocated for medical expenses, this result is fundamentally unfair.
However, not only is this result unfair to Bates, it is also fundamentally unfair to
many other Ohio Medicaid recipients whose settlements are likewise not allocated
for medical expenses. This inequity is even more apparent when considering the fact
that there are many reasons why settlements often are not allocated. For instance,
parties may wish to forgo allocation in an attempt to settle their cases as fast as
possible so that the injured party can have access to money for his care and
rehabilitation, or alternatively, parties may not be able or willing to come to an
allocation agreement that is palatable to all involved. Thus, the tendency has been for

4

Id. at *2, *6.

5

Id. at *2. ODJFS sought reimbursement pursuant to the federal Medicaid third party
liability laws discussed infra Part II.A.
6
Statutory schemes that limit state Medicaid agencies’ recovery to a certain percentage of
Medicaid recipients’ settlements are referred to as statutory caps throughout this Note.
7

ODJFS claimed fifty percent of the settlement because fifty percent ($31,000) was less
than the total amount ODJFS paid on Bates’ behalf ($67,245.37).
8

Bates, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *2.

9

Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).

10

Twenty percent of $67,245.37, the total amount ODJFS paid on Bates’ behalf, is
$13,449.07.
11

Bates, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *6.

12

The Ahlborn ruling is discussed in great detail in infra Part II.B.

13

Bates, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *2-3.
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parties to come to a settlement agreement that is unallocated,14 which ultimately
results in injured parties receiving significantly less than that to which they would
have received if their settlements were allocated.
Not only is this statutory scheme fundamentally unfair to Ohio Medicaid
recipients, it also creates a situation in which compliance with the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Ahlborn is impossible to ensure.15 Accordingly, this Note argues that
Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability statute must either be invalidated by the Ohio
Supreme Court or repealed by the Ohio General Assembly. This Note then goes on
to argue that the Ohio General Assembly must amend its Medicaid third party
liability statute to require settlement allocation before ODJFS can recover the
medical payments it made on behalf of Ohio Medicaid recipients. Finally, this Note
argues that Ohio should also amend its Medicaid third party liability statute to
require that the parties come to an allocation agreement themselves or, if that proves
impossible, to require a judicial allocation hearing to so allocate.
Part II of this Note discusses the federal Medicaid program and state Medicaid
programs’ right to recover medical expenses paid on behalf of Medicaid recipients
when those recipients receive settlements from liable third parties. Part II also
discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Ahlborn and how it affects states’
recovery rights under federal Medicaid and anti-lien law. Finally, Part II discusses
Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability statute and its treatment by the Ohio Tenth
District Court of Appeals.
Part III of this Note argues that the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals
wrongly upheld Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability statute and offers reasons for
that contention. Part III also argues that to ensure compliance with the federal antilien provisions as interpreted by Ahlborn, the Ohio Medicaid third party liability
statute must be amended to require allocation of unallocated settlements before
ODJFS can claim the right to any portion of Ohio Medicaid recipients’ settlements.
Finally, Part III provides case law, statutory, and policy support for the contention
that such allocation is necessary.
Part IV outlines the various ways by which ODJFS’ interests can be protected in
the settlement process, as well as the various ways by which Medicaid recipients’
settlements can be allocated. This Note then concludes by arguing that the best way
to allocate Ohio Medicaid recipients’ settlements in light of Ahlborn is to require the
parties to come to an allocation agreement on their own, and if such allocation
proves impossible, to have the court so allocate following a hearing where all
interested parties have a chance to present their ideas of a fair allocation.
II. MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT LAW POST-AHLBORN
The federal Medicaid program was created to ensure that all Americans, even the
poor, receive medical care. This section examines the federal and state Medicaid
programs and discusses how these programs are entitled to reimbursement for
medical expenses paid on behalf of Medicaid recipients when a third party is held
liable for those medical expenses. This section further discusses the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ahlborn and how this decision has shaped state Medicaid reimbursement
14

Robert B. Pearlman, Ahlborn, Jackson and the Three Most Important Words in
Personal Injury Practice, S.C. LAWYER, Jan. 21, 2010, at 18, 20.
15

This contention will be further discussed infra Part III.
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law. Finally, this section focuses on Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability law, as well
as the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals’ interpretation of that law.
A. The Federal Medicaid Program
The federal Medicaid program was created in 1965 with the enactment of Title
XIX of the Social Security Act.16 This program, which is jointly financed and
administered by the federal government17 and the states,18 is the largest source of
funding for medical and health-related services in America.19 State participation in
the federal Medicaid program is not mandatory; however, because the federal
Government pays between 50% and 83%20 of the costs that states incur for patient
care, every state has opted to participate.21 To receive this federal funding, each state
must establish a single agency to administer the plan22 and comply with federal
statutory requirements governing Medicaid administration.23
1. Third Party Liability Recovery Provisions
While Medicaid was intended “to provide for the medical needs of the poorest
Americans,”24 Congress did not intend for the Program to act as an insurance
16

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396v (West 2013).

17

The program is administered on the federal level by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS): Overview,
ALLGOV.COM (2012), http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-health-and-humanservices/centers-for-medicare-medicaid-services-cms?agencyid=7395.
18

See Ohio Medicaid Statistics, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIP-Program-Information/By-State/ohio.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (“Each state
establishes and administers its own Medicaid program and determines the type, amount,
duration, and scope of services covered within broad Federal guidelines.”).
19

Kathleen Sebelius, HHS: What We Do, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). Medicaid provides for
over fifty million Americans. Id.
20

See Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 n.4 (2006)
(“The exact percentage of the federal contribution is calculated pursuant to a formula keyed to
each State’s per capita income.”).
21

Id. at 275.

22

42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(5) (West 2012) (“A state plan for medical assistance must—either
provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to administer or to
supervise the administration of the plan; or provide for the establishment or designation of a
single State agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan.”).
23
See Ohio Medicaid Basics 2011, HEALTH POLICY INST. OF OHIO, (May 2011),
http://a5e8c023c8899218225edfa4b02e4d9734e01a28.gripelements.com/pdf/publications/basi
cs2011.pdf (“Ohio’s Medicaid program includes services mandated by the federal government
plus optional services the state chooses to provide. Ohio has some discretion to vary the
services it covers but, in all cases, the services must be ‘sufficient in amount, duration, and
scope to reasonably achieve its purpose,’ according to federal regulations (42 C.F.R. §
440.230).”).
24

Suzanne G. Clark, Case Note, An Accident Waiting to Happen: Arkansas Department of
Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn Exposes Inequities in Medical Benefits Legislation, 60
ARK. L. REV. 533, 539 (2007). In Ohio, “Medicaid covers several categories of low-income
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provider.25 Rather, Congress intended for Medicaid to be the payer of last resort of
recipients’ medical expenses.26 Accordingly, as a condition for participation in the
federal Medicaid program, § 1396a(25)(A) of the Social Security Act requires states
to “take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties . . . to
pay for care and services available under the plan.”27 Section 1396a(25)(B) then
requires states to seek reimbursement from such liable third parties.28
2. Third Party Liability Assignment Provisions
Pursuant to this reimbursement requirement, if a third party is found liable for
Medicaid recipients’ medical expenses, § 1396a(25)(H) stipulates that states must
enact laws under which they are considered to have acquired the recipients’ rights to
any settlements between the recipients and the liable third parties as reimbursement
for medical payments the states made on the recipients’ behalf.29 Similarly, §
1396k(a)(1) requires recipients, “as a condition of eligibility for medical assistance,”
to assign to their state all of their rights to such settlements.30
Americans, including children, parents, pregnant women, seniors, and certain people with
disabilities.” HEALTH POLICY INST. OF OHIO, OHIO MEDICAID BASICS 2011 (May 2011),
available
at
http://
a5e8c023c8899218225edfa4b02e4d9734e01a28.gripelements.com/pdf/publications/basics201
1_execsummary.pdf.
25

See Allen N. Trask, III, Comment, Orders from on High: The Current Struggle over
Medicaid Third Party Recovery Between North Carolina and the Supreme Court of the United
States, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 471, 473 (2008) (“Medicaid was intended to provide assistance
to the poor, but it was not intended to act as an insurance policy.”).
26

Trask, supra note 25, at 473.

27

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (West 2012).

28

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (West 2012) (“A State plan for medical assistance must
provide that in any case where such a legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance
has been made available on behalf of the individual and where the amount of reimbursement
the State can reasonably expect to recover exceeds the costs of such recovery, the State or
local agency will seek reimbursement for such assistance to the extent of such legal
liability.”).
29

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) (West 2012) (“A State plan for medical assistance must
provide, that to the extent that payment has been made under the State plan for medical
assistance in any case where a third party has a legal liability to make payment for such
assistance, the State has in effect laws under which, to the extent that payment has been made
under the State plan for medical assistance for health care items or services furnished to an
individual, the State is considered to have acquired the rights of such individual to payment by
any other party for such health care items or services.”).
30
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) (West 2012) (“For the purpose of assisting in the
collection of medical support payments and other payments for medical care owed to
recipients of medical assistance under the State plan approved under [42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et
seq.], a State plan for medical assistance shall (1) provide that, as a condition of eligibility for
medical assistance under the State plan to an individual who has the legal capacity to execute
an assignment for himself, the individual is required—(A) to assign the State any rights, of the
individual or of any other person who is eligible for medical assistance under [42 U.S.C. §§
1396 et seq.] and on whose behalf the individual has the legal authority to execute an
assignment of such rights, to support (specified as support for the purpose of medical care by a
court or administrative order) and to payment for medical care from any third party.”).
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B. The Effect of Ahlborn on State Medicaid Reimbursement Statutes
Initially, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) “interpreted
the[se] Medicaid third party liability provisions to authorize [s]tates to pass laws
permitting full recovery of Medicaid assistance payments from third party liability
settlements, regardless of how [or if] the parties allocated the settlement.”31
However, in Ahlborn, the seminal decision on these Medicaid third party liability
provisions, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected CMS’ interpretation and held
that state Medicaid agencies may only recover the limited portion of the settlement
that actually represents medical expenses.32
This unanimous decision arose out of a 1996 car accident in which Heidi
Ahlborn, “then a 19 year old college student and aspiring teacher, suffered severe
and permanent injuries”33 due to the negligence of two tortfeasors.34 Because her
“liquid assets were insufficient to pay for her medical care,” Ahlborn was forced to
rely on Arkansas’ Medicaid program, the Arkansas Department of Human Services
(ADHS),35 to pay $215,645.30 worth of her medical expenses.36
In 1997, Ahlborn filed suit against the tortfeasors seeking damages for those
medical expenses, as well as for “permanent physical injury; future medical
expenses; past and future pain, suffering, and mental anguish; past loss of earnings
and working time; and permanent impairment of the ability to earn in the future.”37
Rather than taking her case to trial, however, Ahlborn settled with the tortfeasors for
$550,000, one sixth of her original $3,040,708.12 claim.38 Then, pursuant to the
Arkansas Medicaid third party liability statute, ADHS claimed its right to
reimbursement from this settlement.39 Accordingly, ADHS asserted a lien40 against
Ahlborn’s settlement in the amount of $215,645.30—the total amount of medical
expenses ADHS paid on Ahlborn’s behalf.41
31
Memorandum from Gale Arden, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & State Operations: Disabled &
Elderly Health Programs Grp., on State Options for Recovery Against Liab. Settlements in
light of Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, to All Assoc. Reg’l Adm’rs for Medicaid &
State
Operations
(July
3,
2006),
available
at
http://www.
specialneedsnj.com/article.php?id=20 [hereinafter Arden, Memorandum].
32

Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 282 (2006).

33

Id. at 273. Ahlborn “was left brain damaged, unable to complete her college education,
and incapable of pursuing her chosen career.” Id.
34

Id. at 272-73.

35

What
is
Medicaid?,
ARK.
MEDICAID,
https://www.medicaid.state.ar.us/
InternetSolution/General/whatis.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
36

Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 273.

37

Id. ADHS was not named as a party in this suit. Id.

38

Id. at 274.

39

Id.

40

Justice Stevens acknowledged that a state’s recovery for medical expenses paid on
behalf of a Medicaid recipient amounts to a lien on the beneficiary’s settlement. Id. at 286 (“A
lien is typically imposed on the property of another for payment of a debt owed by that other. .
. . That the lien is also called an ‘assignment’ does not alter the analysis.”).
41

Id. at 274.
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In reaction to ADHS’ lien against her settlement, Ahlborn filed suit against
ADHS in 2002, claiming Arkansas’ Medicaid third party liability statute, which
allowed ADHS to claim the rights to her settlement for the full amount of medical
expenses paid on her behalf, 42 violated the anti-lien provisions of the Social Security
Act: §§ 1396p(a)(1) and 1396(a)(18).43 Section 1396p(a)(1) prohibits states from
imposing liens “against the property44 of any individual prior to [her] death on
account of medical assistance paid on [her] behalf under the State [Medicaid
program],”45 and § 1396(a)(18) requires states to comply with § 1396p(a)(1).46
Ahlborn argued that because the parties stipulated47 that only $35,581.4748 of her
settlement was designated for medical expenses, ADHS’ claim to the full amount of
medical expenses paid on her behalf ($215,645.30) violated the anti-lien provisions
insofar as such a claim “would require depletion of compensation for injuries other
than past medical expenses.”49 In other words, Ahlborn argued that if ADHS claimed
the right to more than $35,581.47 of her settlement, it would claim the right to funds
that were not designated for medical expenses,50 thereby asserting a lien on her

42

Id. at 277-78 (“‘As a condition of eligibility’ for Medicaid, an applicant ‘shall
automatically assign his or her right to any settlement, judgment or award which may be
obtained against any third party to [ADHS] to the full extent of any amount which may be
paid by Medicaid for the benefit of the applicant.” (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-309(a)
(2001) (repealed 2006)).
43

Id. at 274.

44

Any assignment to a state of the right to an individual’s settlement funds would be
considered a lien on the personal property of an individual because settlement funds are
considered personal property and state assignments of rights to such settlements are
considered liens. See Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2002)
(“Essentially, at the time of an accident, the injured party acquires in tort one or more
[property] rights of action or claims against those responsible for injuries. These rights of
action or claims can be likened to a ‘bundle of sticks.’” (quoting United States v. Ben-Hur, 2
F.3d 313, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1994))); see also supra text accompanying note 40.
45

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(a)(1) (West 2013).

46

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(18) (West 2013) (“A State plan for medical assistance must
comply with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p with respect to liens, adjustments and
recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid.”).
47

Originally, Ahlborn’s settlement was unallocated; however, “to facilitate the District
Court’s resolution of the legal questions presented,” the parties stipulated to the amount in the
settlement that represented the medical payments ADHS made on Ahlborn’s behalf. Ahlborn,
547 U.S. at 274.
48

Since Ahlborn settled her claim for one-sixth of its true value, the parties stipulated that
medical expenses in the settlement should be reduced pro rata to $35,581.47, because the
amount was one-sixth of the $215,645.30 that ADHS paid on Ahlborn’s behalf for medical
expenses. Id.
49

Id.

50

Funds not designated for medical expenses in Ahlborn’s settlement included those for
“permanent physical injury; future medical expenses; past and future pain, suffering, and
mental anguish; past loss of earnings and working time; and permanent impairment of the
ability to earn in the future.” Id. at 273.
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personal property “on account of medical assistance paid on [her] behalf”51 that was
not excepted by the assignment provisions.52 ADHS, however, argued that the
Medicaid third party assignment provisions permitted such a claim.53
Upon review of both arguments, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
assignment provisions create an exception to the absolute prohibition of placing liens
on Medicaid recipients’ settlements on account of medical assistance paid on their
behalf when third parties are liable for such assistance; 54 however, the Court made
clear that “the exception carved out by [the anti-lien provisions] is limited to
payments for medical care. Beyond that, the anti-lien provision[s] appl[y].”55
The Supreme Court then went on to hold that state Medicaid agencies may only
recover that limited portion of Medicaid recipients’ settlements that actually
represents payments for medical care,56 which in Ahlborn’s case, was the portion of
her settlement that the parties stipulated to representing medical care.,57 To hold
otherwise, the Court reasoned, would violate the anti-lien provisions because the
state would then be permitted to take from other categories of damages that are the
personal property of Medicaid recipients and are not excepted by the assignment

51

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(a)(1) (West 2013).

52

Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 274; see also Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 15
(Minn. 2002) (“As a condition of receiving medical assistance from a state, a medical
assistance recipient assigns to the state one stick from that bundle [of sticks]—the specific
claim to recover medical expenses from those responsible for the injuries. . . . But the
recipient retains ownership of the remaining sticks in the bundle. . . . To the extent that any
settlement with the responsible third parties is for this large bundle of sticks (the original tort
action minus the claim for medical care), the settlement proceeds are the recipient’s personal
property, and as such are protected by the federal anti-lien provision[s].”).
53

Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 285-86.

54

Id. at 284 (“To the extent that the forced assignment is expressly authorized by the
terms of §§ 1396a(a)(25) [sic] and 1396k(a), it is an exception to the anti-lien provision.”).
55

Id. at 284-85.

56

Id. at 282 (“[The federal third-party liability provisions require an assignment of no
more than the right to recover that portion of a settlement that represents payments for medical
care.”). The Supreme Court came to this conclusion after a thorough examination of the
federal Medicaid and anti-lien provisions, emphasizing the language in those provisions that
supports the contention that the assignment provisions only authorize assignment of rights to
damages that represent medical care. Id. at 280 (“Medicaid recipients must, as a condition of
eligibility, ‘assign the State any rights . . . to payment for medical care from any third party.’”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) (2006))); Id. (“[Section] 1396a(a)(25)(B)’s requirement
that states ‘seek reimbursement for [medical assistance] to the extent of such legal liability’
(emphasis added) . . . [refers to], as is evident from the context of the emphasized language,
‘such legal liability of third parties . . . to pay for care and services available under the plan.’”
(quoting § 1396a(a)(25)(B) and § 1396a(25)(A), respectively)); Id. at 281 (“[Section
1396a(a)(25)(H)] makes clear that the State must be assigned ‘the rights of [the recipient] to
payment by any other party for such health care items or services.’” (quoting §
1396a(a)(25)(H))).
57

In settlements that are allocated, state Medicaid agencies would only be entitled to the
portion allocated for medical expenses.
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provisions.58 Therefore, in Ahlborn’s case, because the parties stipulated that
$35,581.47 was the portion of her settlement that represented medical care, the
Supreme Court ruled that ADHS could only recover $35,581.47 from her settlement
as reimbursement for medical payments made on her behalf.59
While the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that states may recover only the portion
of a Medicaid recipient’s settlement that represents medical care, the Court was
silent as to how states should determine that portion when the settlement is
unallocated and the parties do not stipulate to the amount of that unallocated
settlement that represents medical care. As such, states have been left on their own to
create methods of calculating the appropriate amount of reimbursement to which
they are entitled from unallocated settlements and have accordingly established a
multitude of varying rules and procedures for that calculation.60
C. The Ohio Medicaid Third Party Liability Statute
In Ohio, Revised Code § 5101.58 governs ODJFS’ right to reimbursement, and
specifically, subdivision (G)(2) establishes the Ohio rule for seeking that
reimbursement from unallocated settlements. Section 5101.58(A) stipulates that
“[t]he acceptance of public assistance gives an automatic right of recovery to
[ODJFS] . . . against the liability of a third party for the cost of medical assistance
paid on behalf of the [the Medicaid recipient].”61 This statute also entitles ODJFS to
recover from a Medicaid recipient’s settlement with a liable third party the medical
payments it made on the recipient’s behalf.62

58
Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 285; see also Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 15
(Minn. 2002) (“As a condition of receiving medical assistance from a state, a medical
assistance recipient assigns to the state one stick from that bundle [of sticks]—the specific
claim to recover medical expenses from those responsible for the injuries. . . . But the
recipient retains ownership of the remaining sticks in the bundle. . . . To the extent that any
settlement with the responsible third parties is for this large bundle of sticks (the original tort
action minus the claim for medical care), the settlement proceeds are the recipient’s personal
property, and as such are protected by the federal anti-lien provision.”).
59

Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 285.

60

See Jospeh D. Juenger, In Light of Ahlborn—Designing State Legislation to Protect the
Recovery of Medicaid Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 103, 122
(2008) (“[W]here no allocation of damages is expressly set forth, the States must establish
rules and procedures in order to ‘seek reimbursement.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(25)(B))). See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brown v. N.C. Dep’t. of
Health & Human Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2792 (March 12, 2009) (No. 08-1146), 2009 WL 698514
[hereinafter Brown Writ].
61
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.58(A) (LexisNexis 2013). This section is in compliance
with 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(25)(A)-(B) (2013) of the federal Medicaid statute discussed supra
Part II.A.1.
62

Id. (“When an action or claim is brought against a third party by a public assistance
recipient or participant, any payment, settlement or compromise of the action or claim, or any
court award or judgment, is subject to the recovery right of the department of job and family
services or county department of job and family services.”). This section was written to
comply with 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(25)(H) and 1396k(a) of the federal Medicaid statute
discussed supra Part II.A.2.
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In response to the Ahlborn decision, the Ohio General Assembly amended §
5101.58 in 2007 with the addition of subdivision (G)(2).63 Section 5101.58(G)(2)
permits ODJFS to recover from a Medicaid recipient’s unallocated settlement the
less all of the medical expenses it paid on the recipient’s behalf or fifty percent of the
recipient’s total settlement after deducting reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and
expenses.64
D. The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals’ Interpretation of § 5101.58(G)(2) in
Encompass Indemnity Co. v. Bates
Section 5101.58(G)(2)’s fifty percent statutory cap formulation was challenged
as a violation of the federal anti-lien provisions per Ahlborn in Encompass Indemnity
Co. v. Bates,65 the case whose factual background was discussed in the Introduction
of this Note. In Bates, appellant Brian K. Bates’ settlement with the liable driver was
not specifically allocated for medical expenses; however, because he settled his
claim for twenty percent of its true value, Bates nonetheless argued that only
$13,449.07 (twenty percent of the $67,245.37 ODJFS paid on Bates’ behalf) of his
settlement represented medical expenses.66 As such, Bates argued that “ODJFS may
not be reimbursed more than 20 percent of the amount it paid towards [his] medical
bills” without violating the federal anti-lien provisions as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Ahlborn.67
Despite Bates’ argument, the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court and decided that compliance with Ahlborn did not require
such a pro rata reduction in ODJFS’ recovery.68 In so deciding, the court relied upon
an earlier Medicaid third party liability case, Mulk v. Ohio Department of Job &
Family Services,69 and held that
63

Mulk v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 969 N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ohio Ct. App.
2011).
64

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.58(G)(2) (LexisNexis 2013) (“Reasonable attorneys' fees,
not to exceed one-third of the total judgment, award, settlement, or compromise, plus costs
and other expenses incurred by the recipient or participant in securing the judgment, award,
settlement, or compromise, shall first be deducted from the total judgment, award, settlement,
or compromise. After fees, costs, and other expenses are deducted from the total judgment,
award, settlement, or compromise, the department of job and family services or appropriate
county department of job and family services shall receive no less than one-half of the
remaining amount, or the actual amount of medical assistance paid, whichever is less.”).
65

Encompass Indem. Co. v. Bates, No. 11AP-1010, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012).
66

Id. at *6.

67

Id.

68

Id. at *6-7.

69

Mulk v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 969 N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ohio Ct. App.
2011). In Mulk, after multiple appellants required Medicaid to pay for medical care they
received as a result of injuries sustained due to the tortious conduct of third parties, appellants
argued “that the principles established in Ahlborn require[d] a pro rata reduction of [ODJFS’]
recovery from any judgment or settlement for medical expenses paid to account for attorney’s
fees and costs.” Id. at 1258-59. Thus, because appellants had a one-third contingency fee
agreement, which would reduce their settlement by 33%, appellants argued that ODJFS’
recovery for medical expenses must be reduced by 33%. Id. at 1259. Appellants argued that if
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by limiting ODJFS to one-half of the settlement amount remaining after
deducting attorney’s fees, costs and expenses, or the full amount of the
medical expenses paid by ODJFS, whichever is less, [§ 5101.58(G)(2)]
address[es] the concern raised in Ahlborn—that reimbursement not go
beyond an amount representing payments for medical care.70
The Tenth District justified this holding based on the fact that “[§ 5101.58(G)(2)]
is structured to ensure that [ODJFS] will take no more than half of the remaining
recovery, thereby ensuring that the injured party will retain a portion of the judgment
or settlement to compensate for other categories of damages.”71 Thus, the court
determined that “[t]he General Assembly [] created a valid method to fulfill its
obligations under [Ahlborn] and to preserve an injured party’s recovery of other
categories of damages.”72
As of today, no appeal has yet been made in Bates, and the Supreme Courts of
the United States and Ohio have refused to hear further appeals in Mulk.73 Despite its
being challenged, therefore, § 5101.58(G)(2) remains the current Medicaid third
party liability law in the State of Ohio.
III. TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH AHLBORN, § 5101.58(G)(2) MUST BE
INVALIDATED OR REPEALED AND § 5101.58 MUST BE AMENDED TO REQUIRE
ALLOCATION OF UNALLOCATED SETTLEMENTS BEFORE ODJFS MAY RECOVER
Though § 5101.58(G)(2) remains the third party liability law in the State of Ohio,
this section will argue that either the Ohio Supreme Court must invalidate it or, in
the alternative, the Ohio General Assembly must repeal it. This section further
discusses how Bates was wrongly decided and argues that to ensure compliance with
Ahlborn, § 5101.58 must be amended to require the allocation of unallocated
settlements before ODJFS may recover the medical expenses it paid on behalf of
Medicaid recipients. Finally, this section provides case law, statutory, and policy
support for the contention that allocation is necessary.

the recovery was not so reduced, it would “‘dip into’ the portion of the judgment or settlement
compensating for other forms of damages, such as lost wages or pain and suffering, in order to
satisfy their attorney’s fees and costs,” and would therefore violate the anti-lien provisions. Id.
The court, however, determined that because the recipients’ settlements were not allocated, §
5101.58(G)(2) created a valid method of reimbursement that complied with Ahlborn. Id. The
court reasoned that § 5101.58(G)(2) complied with Ahlborn because it provided for the
payment of attorney’s fees, while ensuring that “the injured party w[ould] retain a portion of
the . . . settlement to compensate for other categories of damages,” as it ensured that ODJFS
would take no more than half of the entire settlement. Id.
70

Bates, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *12-13.

71

Id. at *13 (quoting Mulk, 969 N.E.2d at 1259).

72

Id. (quoting Mulk, 969 N.E.2d at 1264).

73

The Ohio Supreme Court refused to hear a discretionary appeal for Mulk. Mulk, 963
N.E.2d 824 (Ohio 2011). The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. Mulk, 133
S. Ct. 242 (2012).
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A. The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals’ Decision in Mulk and Bates are
Contrary to the Principles Established in Ahlborn and to Principles of Justice
While the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals refused to invalidate §
5101.58(G)(2), this sub-section demonstrates that the court should have done so for
multiple reasons. First of all, under § 5101.58(G)(2), compliance with the anti-lien
provisions as interpreted by Ahlborn is impossible to ensure and creates the likely
possibility that a recovery by ODJFS will in fact violate the federal anti-lien
provisions. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ahlborn simply does not
support the Tenth District’s justification for upholding § 5101.58(G)(2).
1. Compliance With the Federal Anti-Lien Provisions as Interpreted by Ahlborn is
Impossible to Ensure Under § 5101.58(G)(2)’s Statutory Scheme
In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court was abundantly clear that “the federal third-party
liability provisions require an assignment of no more than the right to recover the
portion of a settlement that represents payments for medical care.”74 Under §
5101.58(G)(2), however, compliance with this rule is impossible to ensure because
no consideration is actually given to the amount in the settlement that actually
represents payments for medical care. Rather, the fifty percent cap creates an
unjustified and unverified presumption that the parties intended either the full value
of the amount ODJFS paid on the recipient’s behalf or fifty percent of the recipient’s
total settlement minus fees and costs to represent payments for medical care.75 As is
evident from the plight of Bates, as well as the plights of the appellants in Mulk,
however, this presumption does not always reflect the true intentions of Medicaid
recipients, many of whom believe the medical expenses reflected in their settlements
are limited pro rata by the percent by which they settled their claim. 76 Therefore,
because § 5101.58(G)(2) fails to ensure, as Ahlborn requires, that ODJFS’ recovery
is properly limited to the portion of a settlement that actually represents payments for
medical care, the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals should have invalidated it.
2. Section 5101.58(G)(2) Creates the Likely Possibility that ODJFS’ Recovery Will
Violate the Federal Anti-Lien Provisions
The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals should not only have invalidated §
5101.58(G)(2) because it fails to ensure that ODJFS’ recovery is properly limited to
medical expenses, but it also should have invalidated § 5101.58(G)(2) because it
creates the likely possibility that an ODJFS recovery will actually violate federal
anti-lien provisions. In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court determined that “the federal
Medicaid anti-lien [provisions] allow a narrow exception for liens that are limited to

74

Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 282 (2006) (emphasis added).

75

See Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2013) (In discussing North Carolina’s nonrebuttable one-third statutory cap formulation, the Court noted, “[t]he problem is not that it is
an unreasonable approximation in all cases. In some cases, it may well be a fair estimate. But
the State provides no evidence to substantiate its claim that the one-third allocation is
reasonable in the mine run of cases. Nor does the law provide a mechanism for determining
whether it is a reasonable approximation in any particular case.”).
76

See supra text accompanying notes 68-69, 71.
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recoveries only for medical expenses.”77 A state statute that authorizes recovery of
more than medical expenses thus violates the anti-lien provisions because that
recovery would be a lien on the personal property78 of a Medicaid recipient that was
not excepted by the third party assignment provisions.79
Under § 5101.58(G)(2), the likelihood of such a violation of the federal anti-lien
provisions arises.80 In fact, § 5101.58(G)(2) will always violate the anti-lien
provisions when, as was the case in Bates and Mulk, the amount paid by ODJFS for
medical services exceeds the amount in the settlement that the parties believed to
represent medical expenses, but is less than one half of the total settlement.81 In such
a case, ODJFS’ recovery encroaches upon other categories of damages, which
Ahlborn specifically forbids.82
Moreover, such a case likely violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution as well. Under the Supremacy Clause, “[w]here a state and federal law
‘directly conflict,’ state law must give way.”83 Because the State of Ohio’s
§ 5101.58(G)(2) creates the likelihood of directly conflicting with the anti-lien
provisions of the federal Social Security statute, the Tenth District Court of Appeals
should have invalidated because it likely violates the Supremacy Clause as well.
3. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning in Ahlborn does not support the Ohio Tenth
District Court of Appeals’ Justification for Upholding § 5101.58(G)(2)
The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals’ justification for upholding
§ 5101.58(G)(2)—that it comports with Ahlborn because it guarantees that Medicaid
recipients will receive at least some portion of the settlement as compensation for
other categories of damages—is also not supported by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Ahlborn. In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court’s held not that Medicaid recipients must
maintain some compensation for other categories of damages when state Medicaid
agencies seek reimbursement for medical payments. Rather, the Supreme Court’s
holding was that a state Medicaid agency’s recovery violates the federal anti-lien

77

In re E.B., 729 S.E.2d 270, 289 (W. Va. 2012). This exception is the Medicaid third
party assignment provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
78

See Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002).

79

Supra text accompanying notes 55-57.

80

Cf. Elizabeth A. Grymes, Note, A Post-Ahlborn Analysis of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina’s Decision in Andrews v. Haygood, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 525, 539 (2010).
81
Cf. Andrews v. Haygood, 669 S.E.2d 310, 317 (N.C. 2008) (Hudson, J., dissenting)
(“Application of the [one-third statutory cap formulation] in a case like this one, in which
there has been no allocation, could allow precisely the result that is explicitly barred by
Ahlborn. In fact, this would be the outcome with any settlement in which the amount actually
paid by [the state Medicaid agency] is greater than the amount of the settlement designated for
medical expenses, but less than the one-third cap.”).
82
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 281 (2006) (“The [Medicaid]
statute does not sanction an assignment of rights to payment for anything other than medical
expenses—not lost wages, not pain and suffering, not an inheritance.”).
83

PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011).
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provisions unless that recovery is narrowly tailored to the portion of a settlement that
represents medical expenses.84
Thus, the Supreme Court was concerned with ensuring that state Medicaid
agencies recover no more than that to which they are legally entitled from Medicaid
recipients’ settlements; it was not concerned with ensuring those recipients had at
least some compensation for damages other than medical expenses. The Ohio Tenth
District Court of Appeals’ justification for upholding § 5101.58(G)(2), therefore, has
no merit under Ahlborn.
B. Section 5101.58(G)(2) Should be Amended to Require the Allocation of
Unallocated Settlements Before ODJFS May Recover for Medical Expenses
As discussed above, the Tenth District’s justification for upholding
§ 5101.58(G)(2) is without merit; under § 5101.58(G)(2) there is no way to ensure
compliance with Ahlborn; and in fact, § 5101.58(G)(2) creates the likely possibility
that the anti-lien provisions and United States Supremacy Clause will in fact be
violated. Accordingly, § 5101.58(G)(2) must either be invalidated by the Ohio
Supreme Court upon appeal of Bates,85 or in the alternative, be repealed by the Ohio
General Assembly.
Additionally, the General Assembly must amend § 5101.58 to require allocation
of unallocated settlements before ODJFS can claim the right to any portion of Ohio
Medicaid recipients’ settlements. Requiring such an allocation will ensure
compliance with the anti-lien provisions as interpreted by Ahlborn by ensuring that
ODJFS’ recovery will be properly limited to the portion of a settlement that the
parties actually intended to represent medical expenses. This sub-section provides
case law, other states’ statutory law, and considerations of fairness and the justice
system to support the contention that allocation should be required.
1. Case Law Supports the Contention that § 5101.58 Should be Amended to Require
Allocation
The contention that under § 5101.58(G)(2) compliance with Ahlborn is
impossible to ensure and should therefore be amended to require allocation is
supported by the fact that the United States Supreme Court, federal courts, and
various state courts have all invalidated statutory cap formulations both exactly like
and similar to Ohio’s § 5101.58(G)(2). These courts have held that to ensure
compliance with Ahlborn, allocation of unallocated settlements should be mandated
before state Medicaid agencies may recover for medical expenses.
The Supreme Court so decided in its 2013 decision, Wos vs. E.M.A. ex rel.
Johnson.86 In Wos, the Supreme Court was called to determine whether North
Carolina’s one-third statutory cap formulation was compatible with Ahlborn and the
anti-lien provisions.87 The case came to the Court after a series of state and federal
opinions relating to the North Carolina statute came into conflict.
84

Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 292 (“Federal Medicaid law does not authorize ADHS to assert a
lien on Ahlborn’s settlement in an amount exceeding [that which represents medical
expenses], and the federal anti-lien provision affirmatively prohibits it from doing so.”).
85

Because, as discussed in supra note 73, appellants have exhausted their appeals in Mulk.

86

Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013).

87

Id. at 1395.
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The first of these opinions was the North Carolina Supreme Court’s: Andrews v.
Haygood.88 In Andrews, the court held that North Carolina’s one-third statutory cap
formulation was “a reasonable method for determining the State’s medical
reimbursements” when a settlement was not specifically allocated for medical
reimbursements.89 The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, in Armstrong v. Cansler,90 agreed with the North Carolina Supreme
Court’s decision in Andrews.91 Upon appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit held in
E.M.A ex rel. Plyler v. Cansler that North Carolina’s one-third statutory cap “fail[s]
to comply with federal Medicaid law as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Ahlborn,”92 stating, “[w]e are not persuaded that a mere ‘reasonable cap’ on a
settlement satisfies the federal anti-lien law as required by Ahlborn.”93
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit, holding that “[a]n
irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory presumption is incompatible with the
Medicaid Act’s clear mandate that a State may not demand any portion of a
beneficiary’s tort recovery except the share that is attributable to medical
expenses.”94 Thus, the Court noted, that in cases where medical expenses were
neither allocated in the settlement nor stipulated to by the parties,95 an allocation
must be made to protect “from state demand the portion of a [Medicaid recipient’s]
tort recovery that the . . . judgment does not attribute to medical expenses.”96
The Supreme Court of West Virginia likewise determined that West Virginia’s
one-third statutory cap on recovery violated the anti-lien provisions as interpreted by
Ahlborn.97 That court held that “the only way for the State to ensure compliance with
88

Andrews v. Haygood, 669 S.E.2d 310 (N.C. 2008).

89

Id. at 314.

90

Armstrong v. Cansler, 722 F. Supp. 2d 653 (W.D.N.C. 2013).

91

Id.

92

E.M.A. v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290, 312 (4th Cir. 2012).

93

Id. at 308. The court determined that allocation of unallocated settlements is required so
a Medicaid recipient can have an opportunity to rebut the one-third statutory presumption.
94

Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2013).

95

Id. (“When there has been a judicial finding or approval of an allocation between
medical and nonmedical damages—in the form of either a jury verdict, court decree, or
stipulation binding on all parties—that is the end of the matter.”).
96

Id. While the court seemed to favor a judge or jury determining such an allocation
through a mini-trial based on which party would have been “most likely to prevail on the
claims at trial and how much they reasonably could have expected to receive on each claim if
successful, in view of damages awarded in comparable tort cases,” the court did note that
“States have considerable latitude to design administrative and judicial procedures to ensure a
prompt and fair allocation of damages.” Id. at 1401.
97

In re E.B., 729 S.E.2d 270, 291 (W. Va. 2012) (“We are not persuaded by those
decisions relied upon by [the state Medicaid agency] holding that state Medicaid
reimbursement statutes comply with Ahlborn simply because they contain ‘reasonable
statutory caps’ on recovery from unallocated lump sum settlements. These decisions fail to
require a determination of what portion of a settlement is attributable to medical expenses as
required by Ahlborn.”).
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Ahlborn is to provide for a specific allocation of damages in a settlement . . .
obtained by a recipient of Medicaid assistance.”98 Similarly, in McKinney ex rel.
Gage v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, the district court purposefully decided to
forgo applying a fifty percent statutory cap when it was asked to determine the
portion of an unallocated settlement that was attributable to reimbursement for
medical expenses.99 The majority of other courts that have interpreted Ahlborn have
likewise held that allocation of unallocated settlements is required before state
Medicaid agencies may recover medical expenses paid on behalf of Medicaid
recipients.100
Some of the courts that have not mandated allocation of unallocated settlements
have nonetheless required states to allow Medicaid recipients an opportunity to
challenge state Medicaid third party liability statutes that provide either for full
recovery or full recovery subject to some form of a statutory cap. For example, the
courts in State Department of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson and Price v. Wolford
held that Medicaid recipients must be given an opportunity to rebut a presumption of
full recovery upon a showing of evidence that a more limited allocation of damages
for medical expenses is justified.101 Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
98

Id. at 295.

99

McKinney ex rel. Gage v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 07 Civ. 4432, 2010 WL 3364400, at
*12 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
100

In re E.B., 229 S.E.2d at 290; see also Bolanos v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 180
(Ct. App. 2008) (“The fundamental point is that a settlement that does not distinguish between
past medical expenses and other damages must be allocated between these two classes of
recoveries. Without such an allocation, the principle set forth in Ahlborn, that the state cannot
recover for anything other than past medical expenses, cannot be carried into effect.”); Lugo
v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 819 N.Y.S.2d 892, 896 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that “Ahlborn must
be read to limit the [state Medicaid agency’s] recoupment to the amount of the settlement
proceeds allocated to past medical expenses” and that “[t]his Court is [e]mpowered to
[a]llocate the [s]ettlement [p]roceeds”); Harris v. City of New York, 837 N.Y.S.2d 486, 489
(App. Div. 2007); Wright v. N.Y. Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, No. 0017444/2001, 2007 WL
4229216 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Sw. Fiduciary, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment
Sys. Admin., 249 P.3d 1104, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“When the proper allocation of the
settlement amount to the damage component represented by [the state Medicaid agency]
payments is disputed, the better course is to seek the intervention of the court.”); I.P. ex rel.
Cardenas v. Henneberry, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193-94, 1198 (D. Colo. 2011) (holding that
Colorado’s Medicaid statute comports with Ahlborn because it allows for state reimbursement
to “the fullest extent allowed by federal law,” which the court determined was the “federal
Medicaid laws . . . as interpreted by Ahlborn,” and directed the case to trial to determine the
portion of the settlement that represents medical expenses (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.54-301(5)(a) (2013))).
101
See State Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905, 912 (Idaho 2008),
abrogated by Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 265 P.3d 502 (Idaho 2011) (“If no
[allocation agreement] is reached, [the state Medicaid statute] presumes that the Department is
entitled to recoup amounts it has paid in benefits on behalf of the recipient up to the amount of
the settlement or judgment. However, this presumption is subject to being rebutted. The
Medicaid recipient may present evidence directed toward rebutting the presumption.”); Price
v. Wolford, 608 F.3d 698, 707 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding Oklahoma’s Medicaid statute that
allows for full recovery “unless a more limited allocation of damages to medical expenses is
shown by clear and convincing evidence.” (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
5051.1(D)(1)(d) (West 2012))).
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upheld Pennsylvania’s former one-third statutory cap102 because, “[p]ursuant to the
current statutory framework, beneficiaries unhappy with its results may appeal the
default allocation.”103 After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wos, a Florida appellate
court in Agency for Health Care Administration v. Riley likewise held that “a
plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to seek the reduction of a Medicaid lien
amount established by [Florida’s irrebuttable fifty percent statutory cap], with
evidence, that the lien exceeds the amount recovered for medical expenses.”104
All of the above cases support the contention that to ensure compliance with
Ahlborn, state Medicaid third party liability statutes must either provide for the
allocation of unallocated settlements or provide an opportunity for Medicaid
beneficiaries to rebut a statutory cap presumption. The Supreme Court’s Wos
decision and the Florida appellate court’s Riley decision, however, are exceedingly
persuasive.
The Wos Court explicitly held that “[a]n irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory
presumption,” like the irrebuttable fifty percent statutory cap in Ohio, “is
incompatible with the Medicaid Act’s clear mandate that a State may not demand
any portion of a beneficiary’s tort recovery except the share that is attributable to
medical expenses.”105 In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated an irrebuttable
one-third statutory cap, noting that “[i]f a State arbitrarily may designate one-third of
any recovery as payment for medical expenses, there is no logical reason why it
could not designate half, three quarters, or all of a tort recovery in the same way.”106
Thus, in invalidating North Carolina’s one-third statutory cap, the Supreme Court
explicitly noted that an irrebuttable fifty percent statutory cap, like Ohio’s §
5101.58(G)(2), would be a more egregious violation of the federal anti-lien
provisions. As mentioned above, the Riley stated noted that because of this Wos
decision, its reasoning in its earlier decision upholding Florida’s irrebuttable fifty
percent statutory cap107 was “severely undermined,”108 and as such, mandated that
Florida Medicaid recipients be given the opportunity to rebut that statutory
presumption.109
As Ohio’s § 5101.58(G)(2) provides Ohio Medicaid recipients with an
irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory presumption exactly like Florida’s Medicaid
third party liability statute that was invalidated under Wos, § 5101.58(G)(2) must be
amended to ensure compliance with the anti-lien provisions as interpreted by
102

See infra text accompanying notes 112-13.

103

Tristani ex rel. Karnes v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 2011). The court held
that “in determining what portion of a Medicaid beneficiary’s third-party recovery it may
claim in reimbursement for Medicaid expenses, the state must have in place procedures that
allow a dissatisfied beneficiary to challenge the default allocation.” Id.
104

Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Riley, 119 So. 3d 514, 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013).
105

Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2013).

106

Id. at 1398 (emphasis added).

107

Russell v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 23 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010),
abrogated by Riley, 119 So.3d 514.
108

Riley, 119 So.3d at 515.

109

Id. at 516.
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Ahlborn and Wos. Section 5101.58(G)(2) can be amended to provide a rebuttable
presumption or to mandate allocation of unallocated settlements; however, the best
solution is to amend § 5101.58 to require allocation before ODJFS can recover any
portion of an Ohio Medicaid recipient’s settlement.
2. Statutory Support for the Contention that § 5101.58 Should be Amended to
Require Allocation
The contention that allocation of unallocated settlements is necessary to ensure
compliance with the Ahlborn principles is also supported by the fact that “[i]n
reaction to the Court’s ruling in Ahlborn, many states that previously imposed
statutory caps on Medicaid reimbursement amounts [have since] changed their
laws.”110 For example, prior to Ahlborn, California law, like § 5101.58(G)(2),
provided for state recovery of all of the medical expenses paid on a Medicaid
recipient’s behalf unless those expenses exceeded half the total settlement after
deducting attorney’s fees.111 The California legislature, however, “quickly
recognized that a [fifty percent] cap was not in compliance with [the] Court’s ruling
in Ahlborn, and took prompt steps to amend the statute to eliminate the cap and
provide for an allocation method.”112 Likewise, Pennsylvania law prior to Ahlborn
imposed a fifty percent cap on the state’s recovery;113 however, in response to the
Ahlborn decision, the Pennsylvania legislature amended its Medicaid third party
liability statute to stipulate that in the case of an unallocated settlement, “the court or
agency shall allocate the judgment or award between the medical portion and other
damages.”114
As the Supreme Court in Wos noted, as of 2013, sixteen States and the District of
Columbia provide for some type of judicial hearing to allocate unallocated
settlements before state Medicaid agencies are entitled to recover from any portion
of a Medicaid recipient’s settlement with a liable third party.115 Of these sixteen
states, some “have established rebuttable presumptions and adjusted burdens of
proof to ensure that speculative assessments of a plaintiff’s likely recovery do not
defeat the State’s right to recover medical costs.”116

110

Grymes, supra note 80, at 533.

111

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14124.78 (West 2005).

112

Brown Writ, supra note 62, at 23. The amended § 14124.78 provides for recovery only
of “that portion of a settlement . . . that represents payment for medical expenses . . . provided
on behalf of the beneficiary” and stipulates that “all reasonable efforts shall be made to obtain
the director’s advance agreement to a determination as to what portion of the settlement . . .
represents payment for medical expenses . . . provided on behalf of the beneficiary.” CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 14124.78 (West 2005).
113

E.M.A v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290, 309 (4th Cir. 2012).

114

62 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1409.1(b)(1)-(2) (West 2012).

115

Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (2013); see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-604(b) (2011);
305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-22 (West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-13-125(2) (West
2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 208.215.9 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167:14-a(IV)
(LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.9 (West 2012).
116

Wos, 133 S. Ct. at 1401.
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For example, the Oklahoma legislature amended its Medicaid third party liability
statute, which provided for full recovery of medical expenses paid, to allow
recipients to show “by clear and convincing evidence” that a “more limited
allocation of damages to medical expenses” is justified.117 Massachusetts likewise
provides a rebuttable presumption of full reimbursement,118 whereas Hawaii provides
a rebuttable one-third presumption,119
These statutes support the proposition that to ensure compliance with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ahlborn Ohio’s § 5101.58 should be amended to
require allocation of unallocated settlements. Alternatively, these statutes at the very
least support the proposition that Ohio Medicaid recipients should be allowed an
opportunity to rebut § 5101.58(G)(2)’s fifty percent presumption by demonstrating
that a more limited allocation of damages to medical expenses is justified.
3. Section 5101.58 Should be Amended Because § 5101.58(G)(2) is Fundamentally
Unfair to Ohio Medicaid Recipients
Not only should § 5101.58 be amended because it runs contrary to case and
statutory law, it should also be amended because, as it currently stands, it is
fundamentally unfair to Ohio Medicaid recipients whose settlements with liable third
parties are not allocated. Section 5101.58(G)(2) is unfair to such Medicaid recipients
because it entitles ODJFS to recover much more from their settlements than it would
be entitled to recover if their settlements were allocated without any justifiable
reason for the distinction. This unfairness is evident in Bates’ case, as he received a
full $17,550.93 less than he would have if his settlement was allocated. Such a law,
which bases the amount that a Medicaid recipient can ultimately recover from a
settlement on an arbitrary technicality like allocation, so to speak kicks Ohio
Medicaid recipients with unallocated settlements when they are down: they are
already “the poorest Americans;”120 are injured; take settlements for significantly
less than the true value of their claims; and then, for no justifiable reason, are forced
to give more of that significantly reduced settlement to ODJFS than they would have
if their settlements were allocated. This injustice is even more apparent considering
that the current legal climate favors non-allocation.121
Whether to facilitate “hyper-efficiency in practice” or to avoid confrontation with
the opposing side based on the value of damages associated with each specific claim
in the settlement, the tendency of personal injury lawyers today is “to plead damages
in a general sense, frequently putting forward a laundry list of claims for relief”

117

OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 5051.1(D)(1)(d) (West 2012).

118

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 118E, § 22(c)-(d) (LexisNexis 2012).

119

HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-37(h).

120

See supra text accompanying note 24. Some Medicaid recipients, however, are not the
poorest Americans to begin with, but, after having to pay their medical bills associated with
their injuries, become so poor that they have to rely on Medicaid. Such was the case for both
Ahlborn and Bates. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 273 (2006);
Encompass Indem. Co. v. Bates, No. 11AP-1010, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012). Nevertheless, the fact that they were not poor until their injuries
does not take away from the argument that § 5101.58(G)(2) is fundamentally unfair.
121

Pearlman, supra note 14.
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without actually allocating.122 Given this tendency, as well as the fact that § 5101.58
does not require parties to allocate their settlements, a great deal of Ohio Medicaid
recipients’ settlements will go unallocated, thereby forcing those recipients to assign
to ODJFS much more of their settlement than they would have if their settlements
were allocated for no justifiable reason.To avoid this injustice § 5101.58 must be
amended to require the allocation of unallocated settlements before ODJFS may
recover for medical expenses paid on behalf of Ohio Medicaid recipients.
4. Amending § 5101.58 Would Be Consistent with the Public Policy in Favor of
Settlements
In addition to being highly unfair to Ohio Medicaid recipients with unallocated
settlements, § 5101.58(G)(2) will also have the negative effect of deterring parties
from settling their cases. Parties decide whether to settle or litigate by balancing the
value of the settlement offer against the costs and risks of litigation.123 If the value of
the settlement is greater than the costs and risks of litigation, parties will typically
agree to settle.124 This balancing equation, however, is more difficult to apply in
Medicaid third party liability cases because plaintiffs not only have to weigh the
value of the settlement against the costs and risks of litigation, but they also have to
take into consideration the fact that state Medicaid agencies will claim the right to a
portion of their settlements as reimbursement for medical payments made on their
behalf.
Because § 5101.58(G)(2) gives ODJFS the right to either the entire amount of
medical expenses it paid on behalf of Ohio Medicaid recipients or to half of
recipients’ total settlement minus attorney’s fees and costs, the value of recipients’
settlements likely becomes significantly less than that to which they, like Bates and
the appellants in Mulk, believe they are entitled. Once recipients are appraised of the
possibility receiving such a significantly reduced settlement under § 5101.58(G)(2),
they are likely to decide that the value of their settlement is no longer greater than
the costs and risks associated with litigation, thereby having the effect of many cases
resulting in trial rather than settlement. Thus, as it currently stands, Ohio’s Medicaid
third party liability statute has the effect of disincentivizing Ohio Medicaid recipients
from settling their cases.125
This outcome, however, is contrary to the strong public policy in favor of
settlements.126 Public policy favors settlements over litigation for a number of
122

Id. at 18-20, 22.

123

Stephen Mcg. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12 (1992).
124

Id.

125

Cf. Brief for Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (No. 04-1506) [hereinafter Trial Lawyers’ Brief] (“If this Court were
to rule for petitioner, an injured plaintiff who had received medical treatment funded by
Medicaid would have little incentive to settle her personal injury lawsuit for an amount that
fell far short of her total claim for damages, because any settlement award immediately would
be reduced by the total amount claimed by the state Medicaid agency for reimbursement of
medical expenses paid. . . . Where the cost of treatment funded by Medicaid was substantial,
there would be relatively little, if any money left to compensate plaintiff for her injuries.”).
126
Id. at 10 (“[The Supreme] Court has long recognized a strong public interest in the
expeditious resolution of lawsuits through settlement.”); see also Margaret Meriwether
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reasons;127 however, some of the most important reasons are ensuring the efficient
resolution of lawsuits, easing the burden on the courts,128 and preserving limited
judicial resources.129 To comply with this public policy and to meet these goals,
therefore, § 5101.58 must be amended so that Ohio Medicaid recipients are not
disincentivized from settling due to the law’s effect of significantly reducing the
value of their settlements.
Amending § 5101.58 to require allocation of unallocated settlements would
eliminate that significant reduction in the value of Medicaid recipients’ settlements
because if the recipients’ claims were allocated, ODJFS would only be able to
recover from them that significantly limited amount that was intended to represent
medical expenses. Therefore, by requiring allocation, Ohio Medicaid recipients will
no longer be incentivized to forgo settlement based on the possibility that ODJFS
will claim a significantly larger portion of their settlement than that to which they
believe it is entitled. Thus, allocation would remedy the disincentivizing effect of the
current law.
IV. VARIOUS WAYS BY WHICH BOTH THE INTERESTS OF ODJFS AND OHIO
MEDICAID RECIPIENTS CAN BE PROTECTED IN THE ALLOCATION PROCESS
As discussed in Part III of this Note, to ensure compliance with Ahlborn, §
5101.58(G)(2) must either be invalidated by the Ohio Supreme Court or repealed by
the Ohio General Assembly. Part III of this Note also argued that § 5101.58 must be
amended to require the allocation of unallocated settlements before ODJFS may
recover any portion of Ohio Medicaid recipients’ settlements.
This Section will address concerns that ODJFS may have with regard to such a
statutory amendment and identify how those concerns can be mitigated.
Additionally, this Section will discuss various ways by which Medicaid recipients’
settlements can be allocated and will argue that the best allocation method would be
to require parties to negotiate an appropriate allocation themselves or if the parties
reach an impasse, to have a court determine the allocation following an impartial
hearing.
Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36, 38 (1996)
(noting that the Supreme Court has endorsed the policy favoring settlements since the turn of
the century by declaring that “settlements of matters in litigation, or in dispute, without
recourse to litigation, are generally favored” (quoting St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v.
Mont. Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898))).
127

Cordray, supra note 126, at 36-37.

128

Trial Lawyers’ Brief, supra note 125, at 10 (“Our state and federal judicial systems
would cease to function if all, or even a substantial portion, of cases were litigated to trial.”).
129
Cordray, supra note 126, at 36 (“When parties resolve their dispute through settlement
rather than full litigation, the growing pressure on court dockets is relieved. Settlement thus
enables courts to conserve scarce judicial resources and to reduce their considerable backlog.
Settlement is, as a result, ‘indispensable to judicial administration.’” (quoting Jannah v. GAF
Corp., 887 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1989))); see also Anne Knickerbocker, Annotation, Policy
Encouraging and Favoring Compromise, 15B Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and Settlement § 3
(2012) (“Generally, the law and public policy favor and encourage compromises and
settlements as a means of resolving uncertainties and discouraging lawsuits. Settlement
agreements simplify litigation without taking up valuable court resources, and reduce the
burden on the courts. Accordingly, there is a strong judicial policy in favor of settlements.”).
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A. Methods by Which ODJFS’ Interests Can be Protected in the Settlement
Allocation Process
Although Ohio Medicaid recipients, who will be able to retain more of their
settlements than they would under § 5101.58(G)(2)’s current statutory cap
formulation, will argue that an amendment to § 5101.58 is in their best interests,
ODJFS will likely argue against the amendment for fear that Medicaid recipients
will allocate only a small amount of damages to medical expenses, thereby
“allocating away” most of ODJFS’ interest in the settlement. As discussed in Part
III, such an allocation is necessary to ensure compliance with the federal anti-lien
provision as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ahlborn; however, ODJFS’s
interests in the allocation process can still be protected through the employment of
various mitigation methods. In each of these methods, ODJFS must become
intimately involved in the settlement allocation process.130
ODJFS’ involvement in the settlement allocation process can be ensured through
a variety of ways. One such way is to amend § 5101.58 to require the mandatory
joinder of ODJFS to any claim in which a Medicaid lien is at issue.131 Alternatively,
instead of making the joinder mandatory, § 5101.58 could be amended to require
Medicaid recipients’ attorneys to notify ODJFS of any settlement negotiations,
giving ODJFS the option to intervene and participate in the settlement negotiations if
it so desires.132 Section 5101.58 could also be amended to require ODJFS’ consent
before any allocation of damages is finalized by the parties.133 By requiring or
allowing ODJFS to join the Medicaid recipients’ claims, or by requiring ODJFS to
give its consent to any allocation by Medicaid recipients, ODJFS will be able to
prevent Medicaid recipients from completely allocating away its interest.
There are also more drastic ways in which ODJFS’ interest can be protected in
the settlement allocation process. One such approach is to take the allocation
decision away from all interested parties altogether, leaving the allocation decision
solely within the discretion of the court.134 This approach would then ensure an
impartial allocation for both parties. An even more drastic approach would be to
eliminate the need for allocation altogether. This can be achieved by statutorily
excluding medical expenses from Medicaid recipients’ personal injury settlements,
thereby forcing ODJFS to initiate its own law suits against third parties liable for the

130
See Arden, Memorandum, supra note 31 (“In order to protect the Medicaid program’s
interest in the allocation of settlement monies to medical items and services it is extremely
important for States to be involved in the litigation and settlement process.”).
131

See id. (“States may pass laws which require mandatory joinder of a State when a
Medicaid lien is at issue.”). Such a requirement is consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 2651(d), which
gives the United States the right to join in any action that a Medicaid recipient has against a
liable third party to enforce the state’s right to recovery of medical expenses paid on the
recipient’s behalf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2651(d) (West 2013).
132

Arden, Memorandum, supra note 31.

133

See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006) (“[T]he risk that
parties to a tort suit will allocate away the State’s interest can be avoided . . . by obtaining the
State’s advance agreement to an allocation.”).
134

Id.
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medical expenses paid on behalf of Medicaid recipients.135 ODJFS would therefore
completely avoid the risk of settlement manipulation by Medicaid recipients.
B. Methods by Which Medicaid Recipients’ Settlements can be Allocated
As the above discussion demonstrates, ODJFS’ interests in the settlement
allocation process can be protected through a variety of mitigation methods.
Therefore, this Note will now discuss the variety of ways in which Ohio Medicaid
recipients’ settlements with liable third parties can be allocated.
On one end of the spectrum, the Ohio General Assembly could amend § 5101.58
to require that courts allocate unallocated settlements through an allocation hearing.
Under this method, all interested parties, including ODJFS, would have the
opportunity to be heard and then the court would use its discretion to make an
objective determination of what would constitute a fair allocation based on the
totality of the circumstances.136 This method would ensure that allocation is equitable
for both Medicaid recipients and ODJFS.137 However, this method would also entail
a considerable amount of time and expense, as courts would basically have to engage
in mini-trials to determine appropriate allocations, thereby consuming already
limited judicial resources and prolonging the final settlements.138
On the other end of the spectrum, § 5101.58 could be amended to require the
parties to allocate for medical expenses before the court would approve of any
settlement. Such a pre-settlement allocation requirement would eliminate the waste
of time and expense associated with post-settlement allocation hearings, as well as
the reduce the potential for post-settlement appeals. This approach, however, could
135
See J. Michael Hayes, Are Medicare, Medicaid, and ERISA Liens?, 79 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28,
29-31 (2007).
136

See Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2013) (holding that when an allocation
cannot be reached by settlement agreement or stipulation, a judge or jury should make the
allocation decision in a mini-trial); Trial Lawyers’ Brief, supra note 125, at 19-20; Henning v.
Wineman, 306 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 1981) (deciding that the district court had the
authority to allocate settlement proceeds among recoverable and non-recoverable damages);
Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. 1982) (upholding the trial
court’s use of a post-settlement mini-trial to allocate proceeds); Sw. Fiduciary, Inc. v. Ariz.
Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 249 P.3d 1104, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011)
(“When the proper allocation of the settlement amount to the damage component represented
by [the state Medicaid agency] payments is disputed, the better course is to seek the
intervention of the court.”); E.M.A v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290, 312 (4th Cir. 2012) (“In the
event of an unallocated lump-sum settlement exceeding the amount of the state’s Medicaid
expenditures, as in this case, the sum certain allocable to medical expenses must be
determined by way of a fair and impartial adversarial procedure.”).
137

See Harris v. City of New York, 837 N.Y.S.2d 486 (App. Div. 2007) (holding a hearing
was necessary to determine the percentage of the settlement that should be allocated for
medical expenses despite the fact that the plaintiff alleged the entire settlement award was for
pain and suffering).
138

But see Wos, 133 S. Ct. at 1401 (In response to North Carolina’s argument that holding
mini-trials would be “wasteful, time consuming, and costly,” the Court stated that “[e]ven if
that were true, it would not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the terms of the
Medicaid anti-lien provision. And it is not true as a general proposition. . . . Sixteen States and
the District of Columbia provide for hearings of this sort, and there is no indication that they
have proved burdensome.”).
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also prove problematic if parties cannot agree upon an appropriate allocation. If the
parties are required to allocate before the court can approve a settlement and the
parties cannot come to an allocation agreement, the case will be forced to proceed to
trial, thereby violating the strong public policy favoring settlement.139
Alternatively, and as Bates argued, § 5101.58 could be amended to require that
the allocation decision be based solely on the Ahlborn formula. The Ahlborn formula
divides the settlement amount by the alleged total original value of the claim and
then multiplies that fraction by the total amount that ODJFS paid on behalf of the
Medicaid recipient. The resulting value would be the appropriate amount allocated
for medical expenses.140 Such an amendment would eliminate the time and expense
associated with a mini trial, would eliminate the possibility of being forced to litigate
if the parties cannot agree upon an appropriate allocation in the mandatory presettlement allocation context, and would ensure an efficient resolution of the lawsuit.
Such an amendment does, however, present a major drawback: Since the Ahlborn
formula requires some determination of the original value of the claim, if the parties
cannot agree upon this value, then they will be forced to turn to the court, which
would then be forced to use its scarce resources and hold a mini trial to determine
that value.141
As this discussion illustrates, each of the above-proposed methods has both
positive and negative characteristics. As such, some courts have instituted middleground allocation methods in an attempt to capitalize on the positive characteristics
and reduce the negative ones. Such courts have required that parties first attempt to
allocate for medical expenses on their own, and then, if the parties cannot agree upon
an appropriate allocation, these courts would either apply the Ahlborn formula142 or
hold an allocation hearing143 to determine the appropriate allocation.
C. Section 5101.58 Should be Amended to Require All Interested Parties to Attempt
to Allocate, and if this Proves Impossible, Allocation Should be Court-Determined
Keeping in mind that any allocation determination must consider both the
interests of both Ohio Medicaid recipients and ODJFS, the best allocation method
139

See supra Part III.B.4.

140
For example, in Bates’ case, $100,000 (his settlement value) would be divided by
$500,000 (the alleged total value of his original claim), resulting in a fraction of one-fifth,
which would then be multiplied by $67,245.37 (the amount ODJFS paid on his behalf). The
resulting value, $13,449.07, would then be the appropriate allocation value. See also State
Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905, 912 (Idaho 2008), abrogated by Verska
v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 265 P.3d 502 (Idaho 2011).
141
See McKinney ex rel. Gage v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 07 Civ. 4432, 2010 WL 3364400,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
142

See Hudelson, 196 P.3d at 912.

143

See In re E.B., 729 S.E.2d 270, 297 (W. Va. 2012) (“[A]ll reasonable efforts should be
made to obtain the agreement of [the state Medicaid agency] regarding the allocation of the
Medicaid recipient’s past medical expenses after a settlement has been obtained. However, if
judicial allocation becomes necessary, the trial court is required to hold an evidentiary
damages hearing.”); Bolanos v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 180 (Ct. App. 2008) (“If
there is no settlement allocation, as in a settlement, the parties must attempt to allocate; if they
cannot agree, they must turn to the court.”).
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for the State of Ohio is the middle-ground approach advocated in In re E.B. and
Bolanos.144 Thus, the legislature should amend § 5101.58 to require that parties first
attempt to agree upon an appropriate allocation of the settlement, and if agreement is
impossible to achieve, the court should then hold an allocation hearing in which all
interested parties can produce evidence to establish the value that they believe
appropriately represents medical damages.
In such allocation hearings, courts should use the Ahlborn formula as a starting
point, but should also consider all of the evidence proffered by the interested parties
before making a final allocation decision. For example, courts should hear the
evidence proffered by the parties to confirm the true value of recipients’ original
claims before they apply that value to the Ahlborn formula. Such a confirmation
would ensure that recipients are not exaggerating the true value of their claims,
thereby ensuring an equitable allocation for ODJFS. Courts should also consider
recipients’ injuries145 and how they compare to verdicts in similar cases.146 Finally,
courts should consider the likelihood that recipients would prevail on their claims, as
well as how much they would reasonably expect to recover if they were to prevail to
ensure that the final allocation of medical damages is objectively reasonable for both
recipients and ODJFS.147
To further ensure a fair allocation, and to mitigate any potential negative
consequences associated with mandatory allocation, § 5101.58 must be amended to
require the mandatory joinder of ODJFS to Medicaid recipients’ actions. Such a
mandatory joinder will ensure that recipients and liable third parties will not allocate
away ODJFS’ interest in the settlement, and if the parties cannot agree on an
allocation on their own, will ensure that ODJFS’ interests are properly represented in
any judicial allocation hearing.
In sum, amending § 5101.58 to require allocation of unallocated settlements
ensures that ODJFS’ recovery will be limited to the portion of Ohio Medicaid
recipients’ settlements that was intended to represent medical expenses, thereby
allowing the recipients to keep a greater portion of their settlements than they would
144

See In re E.B., 729 S.E.2d at 297; see Bolanos, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 180.

145

Based on the recipient’s injuries, the court might even determine that the Ahlborn
formula would not be appropriate to use at all. See Bolanos, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 181 (“[T]here
are cases when the assumption of the Ahlborn formula may not apply, i.e., the settlement may
not be driven primarily by past medical expenses. Such cases are those involving catastrophic
injuries to children, where the cost of future medical care, perhaps extending over a lifetime,
is the largest factor in the settlement.”).
146

See Lugo v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 819 N.Y.S.2d 892, 897-98 (App. Div. 2006) (“A
court determination is necessary to confirm the full value of the case and the value of the
various items of damages, including the plaintiff’s injuries and how they compare to verdicts
awarded in other cases.”).
147
See Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1400 (2013) (“What portion of [the] lump sum
settlement constitutes ‘fair and just compensation’ for each individual claim will depend both
on how likely [the Medicaid recipient] would have been to prevail on the claims at trial and
how much they reasonably could have expected to receive on each claim if successful, in view
of damages awarded in comparable tort cases.”); McKinney ex rel. Gage v. Phila. Hous.
Auth., No. 07 Civ. 4432, 2010 WL 3364400, at *12 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“[T]he court has
considered the risks and uncertainties Plaintiffs faced in prevailing on their underlying claim
and their probability of recovering past medical expenses in particular.”).
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under the current § 5101.58(G)(2). Amending § 5101.58 to require the mandatory
joinder of ODJFS to Medicaid recipients’ actions against liable third parties will also
ensure that ODJFS’ interests in the allocation process are protected. Amending §
5101.58 to require that ODJFS, the recipient, and the third party attempt to come to
an agreement on an appropriate allocation will furthermore ensure a swift resolution
of the lawsuit, as well as ensure that scarce judicial resources are not unnecessarily
consumed.148 Finally, by amending § 5101.58 to allow for a judicial allocation
hearing if parties fail to agree on an appropriate allocation, the parties will avoid
having to proceed to a full trial and will be assured of an objective and fair
allocation. Such amendments would therefore ensure that the interests of all the
parties, as well as the interest of the judicial system, are considered and safeguarded.
V. CONCLUSION
In Ahlborn, the unanimous Supreme Court was exceedingly clear in that the
language of the federal Medicaid third party liability provisions stipulates that state
Medicaid agencies may only be assigned the right to the portion of a Medicaid
recipient’s settlement that represents damages for medical expenses. While the Ohio
Tenth District Court of Appeals held that § 5101.58(G)(2) satisfies this standard, the
court’s reasoning is flawed in multiple respects.
First of all, § 5101.58(G)(2) fails to ensure, as Ahlborn requires, that ODJFS’
recovery is properly limited to the portion of Medicaid recipients’ settlements that
actually represents medical damages. Secondly, § 5101.58(G)(2) creates the likely
possibility that any ODJFS recovery will in fact violate the federal anti-lien
provisions, which would therefore violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. Finally, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ahlborn simply does not
support the Tenth District’s justification for upholding § 5101.58(G)(2). The Ohio
Supreme Court must therefore invalidate § 5101.58(G)(2) upon appeal of Bates or, if
no appeal is made or granted, the Ohio General Assembly must repeal it.
Furthermore, to ensure compliance with Ahlborn and the federal anti-lien
provisions, § 5101.58 must be amended to require the allocation of unallocated
settlements before ODJFS may recover for medical expenses paid on behalf of
Medicaid recipients. Such an amendment is supported by the fact that the majority of
courts, and in particular the United States Supreme Court in Wos, that have heard
cases pertaining to statutory caps post-Ahlborn have invalidated the caps and have
required settlement allocation, or at the very least required that Medicaid recipients
be given the opportunity to rebut statutory cap presumptions. Amending § 5101.58
to require allocation is further supported by the actions of the multiple state
legislatures that amended their Medicaid third party liability statutes to require
settlement allocation post-Ahlborn, as well as supported by principles of fairness to
the Medicaid recipient and the strong public policy in favor of settlements.
As the interests of both Ohio Medicaid recipients and ODJFS must be protected
in such mandatory allocations, § 5101.58 must be amended to require that ODJFS
join any action in which a Medicaid lien is at issue. Then, to ensure a swift
148
As the Trial Lawyers’ Brief noted, once a procedure for an allocation hearing is
established, it is rarely used and parties are typically able to agree to an allocation without the
need for the time and expense of an allocation hearing. Therefore, requiring parties to
negotiate an allocation at first will likely save vast amounts of judicial resources. Trial
Lawer’s Brief, supra, note 125, at 21.
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resolution of the lawsuit and to ensure that judicial resources are not unnecessarily
wasted, § 5101.58 must also be amended to require that the parties attempt to agree
upon an appropriate allocation themselves. To avoid having to resort to litigation if
the parties fail to agree upon a proper allocation, however, § 5101.58 must allow the
court to hold an allocation hearing where the Ahlborn formula and all of the
evidence proffered by the parties would be considered to determine an allocation that
would be fair to both Ohio Medicaid recipients and ODJFS.
Such amendments to § 5101.58 will ensure ODJFS’ compliance with the federal
anti-lien provisions as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ahlborn, as well as
ensure that liable third parties will appropriately compensate both Ohio Medicaid
recipients and ODJFS. Accordingly, to prevent violations of the federal anti-lien
provisions, and to protect the interests of Ohio Medicaid recipients and ODJFS, the
Ohio General Assembly must implement these amendments as soon as possible.
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